

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

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FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 5840

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OCON, NATO, NL

SUBJ: SECRETARY'S BILATERAL WITH FONMIN VAN DER STOEL:

DUTCH INTERESTS

FOR EUR/WE-MRS. SHIRLEY

SUMMARY. FONOFF POLITICAL DIRECTOR RUTTEN TOLD DCM  
DECEMBER 3 THAT FONMIN VAN DER STOEL WAS PLANNING TO  
BRING UP THREE SUBJECTS IN HIS DECEMBER 11 BILATERAL  
WITH THE SECRETARY: (1) CIVIL AIR RELATIONS, (2) "OPTION  
THREE" IN MBFR, AND (3) CSCE. END SUMMARY.

1. CIVIL AIR RELATIONS: RUTTEN SAID VAN DER STOEL  
WOULD ENDEAVOR TO IMPRESS THE SECRETARY WITH SERIOUS  
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR US-DUTCH RELATIONS OF ANY  
UNILATERAL US ACTION AGAINST KLM. RUTTEN GAVE NO RPT  
NO INDICATION THAT VAN DER STOEL WOULD PULL OUT ANY  
NEW STOPS, MAKE ANY THREATS OR UNVEIL ANY "SECRET  
WEAPON." RATHER, THRUST OF VAN DER STOEL'S APPROACH  
WOULD BE THAT INTRINSIC VALUE OF OUR BILATERAL INTERESTS  
AS WELL AS NETHERLANDS SOLIDARITY AS A NATO ALLY GREATLY OUT-  
WEIGHED ANY COMMERCIAL GAIN US MIGHT OBTAIN FOR PANAM  
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BY SQUEEZING KLM. DCM, SPEAKING ON A PERSONAL BASIS,

SUGGESTED THAT THE CHANCES FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THIS PREOCCUPYING AND COMMON PROBLEM WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY IMPROVED BY SOME GESTURE OR CONCESSION BY THE DUTCH SIDE THAT WOULD HAVE AN IMMEDIATE, REMEDIAL IMPACT ON PANAM'S DESPERATE FINANCIAL SITUATION. THERE WAS AT PRESENT AN UNBRIDGEABLE GAP BETWEEN THE RESPECTIVE NEGOTIATING POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES. UNLESS THE DUTCH TOOK A STEP TOWARD ACCOMMODATING THE US DESIDERATA, THE DCM SAID, IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT THE US WOULD FEEL IN A POSITION TO MODIFY ITS PRESENT STANCE. RUTTEN SAID HE WOULD PASS ALONG THIS SUGGESTION TO HIS SUPERIORS. (UNLESS THE DEPARTMENT HAS SOME OBJECTION THE DCM WILL MAKE THE SAME SUGGESTION, ON A PERSONAL BASIS, FOR THE DUTCH TO "SWEETEN THE KITTY" WHEN HE SEES MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION WESTERTERP AT 3 P.. LOCAL TIME DECEMBER 5.)

2. MBFR: RUTTEN SAID VAN DER STOEL WILL MAKE A PITCH FOR US AGREEMENT TO INCLUDING OPTION 3 RE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE WEST'S NEGOTIATING OFFER IN VIENNA. RUTTEN RECALLED THAT THE NETHERLANDS DEFENSE WHITE PAPER PROJECTS CERTAIN MANPOWER CUTS PREDICATED ON A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. THE GON APPARENTLY FEELS THAT THE WEST'S CURRENT NEGOTIATING OFFER EXCLUSIVE OF OPTION 3 WOULD NOT BE ENTIRELY DEFENSIBLE VIS-A-VIS DUTCH PUBLIC OPINION, WHICH IS DEFINITELY INTERESTED IN SMALLER DEFENSE BUDGETS MADE POSSIBLE IN PART BY REDUCTIONS IN ACTIVE DUTY FORCES. IN SHORT, RUTTEN INDICATED THAT VAN DER STOEL'S PLEA IN FAVOR OF OPTION 3 WILL DERIVE PRIMARILY FROM DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS.

3. CSCE: VAN DER STOEL WILL SUGGEST THAT THE US USE ITS ACCRUED INFLUENCE WITH THE SOVIETS DERIVING FROM ITS IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS TO INDUCE A MORE FORTHCOMING SOVIET POSTURE IN GENEVA. THE DUTCH ARE SOMEWHAT ENCOURAGED BY THE VARIOUS BASKET 3 CONCESSIONS THE SOVIETS HAVE SO FAR MADE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND BELIEVE THAT WITH A PUSH FROM THE US THE SOVIETS WILL BE PERSUADED TO MAKE THE ADDITIONAL CONCESSIONS

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NECESSARY TO BRING THE CONFERENCE TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. RUTTEN MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE DUTCH ARE NOT HITCHING THEIR STAR TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. THE WORST OUTCOME AND THE ONE WHICH WOULD BE POTENTIALLY THE MOST DANGEROUS FOR WESTERN SOLIDARITY, IN THE DUTCH VIEW, WOULD BE TO GO THROUGH THE MOTIONS OF A THIRD PHASE AT THE CHIEFS OF GOVERNMENT LEVEL WITH NO REAL SUBSTANTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS. THE EUPHORIA THUS

ENGENDERED IN THE WEST COULD BE DANGEROUS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY, ESPECIALLY IN THOSE COUNTRIES LIKE THE NETHERLANDS WHERE PUBLIC OPINION IS ALL TOO PRONE TO ACCEPT A PSEUDO-DETENTE FOR THE REAL THING. IN SUM, RUTTEN ANTICIPATED THAT VAN DER STOEL WOULD ENCOURAGE THE US TO MOVE AWAY FROM AN ATTITUDE OF "BENIGN NEGLECT" AND SHIFT INTO A HIGHER GEAR OF DIRECT INVOLVEMENT AT CSCE. RUTTEN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOME CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE DUTCH AND THE US RE THE FEASIBILITY OF WORKING THROUGH DIPLOMATIC MEANS TO BRING ABOUT INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS IN THE COMMUNIST REGIMES, TO WHICH THE DUTCH ATTACH GREAT EMOTIONAL IMPORTANCE. NEVERTHELESS, RUTTEN THOUGHT THAT THE US SHOULD USE ITS INFLUENCE TO CATALYZE ADDITIONAL SOVIET CONCESSIONS IN BASKET 3 OR, ALTERNATIVELY, DEMONSTRATE THAT THE CONFERENCE HAD FAILED FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN SOVIET REACTIONARY INTRANSIGENCE.

4. COMMENT: IF TIME PERMITS, SECRETARY MAY WISH TO TOUCH BRIEFLY ON CYPRUS AND/OR PORTUGAL WITH A VIEW TO ENLISTING DUTCH UNDERSTANDING AND POSSIBLY SUPPORT FOR WHATEVER MOVES MAY PROVE NECESSARY IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. VAN DER STOEL PERSONALLY AND THE GON IN GENERAL HAVE A GOOD ENTREE TO THE NEW REGIMES IN GREECE AND PORTUGAL. THE DUTCH ALSO BENEFIT IN PORTUGAL FROM THEIR SOCIALIST AFFILIATION WITH SOARES AND HIS PARTY COLLEAGUES IN THE GOP. THE GON IS AWARE OF AND CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF COMMUNIST INFLUENCE AND ASCENDENCY, BOTH INDIGENOUS AND SOVIET INSPIRED, IN THE COMPLEX PORTUGUESE SITUATION. THE GON WOULD BE VERY DISTURBED BY A NEW MILITARY FLARE-UP IN CYPRUS AND WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE COMPLACENT IN THE FACE OF A FURTHER HUMILIATION OF THE GOG UNDER CARAMANLIS. IN VIEW OF THE POTENTIAL

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DANGERS IN BOTH PORTUGUESE AND CYPRUS SITUATIONS, VAN DER STOEL WOULD, WE BELIEVE, BE AMENABLE TO US SUGGESTIONS FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE NATO APPROACH OR FOR PARALLEL ACTION UNDERTAKEN SEPARATELY BY LIKE-MINDED NATO ALLIES.

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